“….we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.”1
Rumsfeld brilliantly summed up the uncertainty of war with his *known knowns* insight. When applied to the war between Israel/USA and Iran it reveals the antecedents of a forever war. A ‘forever war’ is one where it’s impossible to think of a satisfactory conclusion because a military solution is pre-emptively ruled out. That’s also applicable to the Russia-Ukraine war. That campaign, 2026 – present day, has lasted longer than the first and second world wars combined.
The great German military philosopher von Clausewitz expressed an insight similar to that of Rumsfeld in 1832,
War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.2
Rumsfeld and Clausewitz are critical to decision-making before beginning a war of choice. Neither the American or the Russian high commands did so.
Putin was seduced by Russia’s magnificent victory in Crimea, 2014. He didn’t understand the unique characteristics of the 2014 annexation of the Crimea. Trump was seduced by reductionist thinking, ‘We’ve got more and better weapons than they have and therefore we win’. This is wishful thinking.
Let’s consider what they should have done. None of this analysis is ex post facto as every input was available to the Israeli/USA high commands prior to their attacks.
The Rumsfeld Insight and Iran 2026
“….we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know.”
What known knowns were available to the USA’s high command on the 27th February 2026?3 The USA has been an aggressive military power since 1945 resulting in 80 years of failure.4 Why did the high command think the February 28th attack would be different? Secondly, the high command knew the war couldn’t be won by bombing.5
Both of these “known knowns” aren’t secrets. The combined Israeli/USA bombing attack should have been ruled out immediately because of Rumsfeld’s insight. The bombing and missile attacks began as an egregious failure of military planning. The attack was doomed the day before it began.
“We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.”
Israel/USA knew Iran would retaliate but didn’t know how. Israel had long experience of Iranian missile attacks which failed because of their ‘Iron Dome’.6 By ignoring the Rumsfeld insights ‘known unknowns’ they planned for Iranian attacks on Israel.
The Iranian attacks actually focused on the USA’s military bases in the Gulf States, using asymmetric warfare. Instead of high-tech sophisticated weaponry, which is favoured by the USA, they used drones. Thousands of them. Most were shot down by the missile defensive systems but many got through. And the Iranians only needed to succeed with a small percentage to cause grief.
Then they pivoted from the USA’s bases and attacked the critical infrastructure of the Gulf State’s petro-chemical industry. Cheap weaponry inflicted long-term economic damage. The war of choice for the Israeli/USA military cost of billions of dollars for the Gulf States through the destruction of their industrial base.
Applying Rumsfeld’s ‘known unknowns’ it would have been revealed that (1) Iranians knew the ‘Iron Dome’ was effective and, (2) the Gulf States were very difficult to defend. Therefore, the war ought to have been cancelled.
“But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.”
It seems the Israeli/USA attack couldn’t have been cancelled by “unknown unknowns”. After all, how can something, which is unknown, be decisive? Von Clausewitz suggests that an unknown can be considered,
A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.
Many things were known about the Iranian military by Israel/USA. One of which was that Iran was militarily inferior. Iran’s high command knew this too. They knew they had to play to their strengths. This turned out to be geography. A geographical asset isn’t a secret. What’s critical is using, “skilled intelligence,” to discern what is a strategic military asset. Iran did and the Israeli/USA didn’t. The Israelis and the USA were trapped in bounded rationality because they weren’t using philosophical tools of analysis.
All that was needed was to know that the Straits of Hormuz are (1) narrow and (2) are used by shipping for 20% of global oil and 33% of global fertilizer. Iran’s high command knew slugging it out with the Israeli/USA military was lunacy. The Israel/USA attack was predicated on this fact but they didn’t use Rumsfeld’s ‘unknown unknown’ concept and they absolutely weren’t using Clausewitz’s ‘skilled intelligence.’ Iranblockaded the Straits of Hormuz with cheap drones and uncrewed, attack boats achieving a decisive military edge. Against all the odds.
Conclusion
Gung-ho high commands egged on by politicians don’t use philosophy as a key skill. Critical thinking like that of Rumsfeld and Clausewitz might be inconvenient but it is essential to military decision-making.
Notes
1 There are unknown unknowns – Wikipedia
2 Fog of war – Wikipedia
3 This is the day before the attack began
4 80 years of American military failure A podcast 3 minutes long. The only unequivocal success they have had was in 1991 with the liberation of Kuwait from Saddam Hussain’s Iraq.
5 Bombing always fails Another 3 minute podcast Apart from the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing has never been decisive
6 Iron Dome – Wikipedia