The Hamas attack was shocking but had probably been war gamed by Israeli chiefs of staff. Only the detail of the 7th October attack amazed and caused a military earthquake. The attack itself was a classic asymmetric hit-and-run incursion.
Hamas: the strategic context
Hamas don’t have an air force, heavy artillery, tanks, navy, or weaponised drones. Their strategy is high intensity combat based on ambushes, booby-traps, snipers and opportunistic attacks. Hamas can’t defeat Israel in any form of warfare. But what they can do is inflict significant casualties through attritional guerrilla warfare.
Hamas knew Israel would ferociously retaliate after 7th October just as they did in 2014.1 Their strategy is predicated on their underground capacity. History makes for sombre reading for their strategists. Only the Vietnamese Cu Chi tunnels,2 helped to defeat the USA in the 1960s and 70s. Notable failures include the 1944 Warsaw Rising by Polish resistance fighters.3 Urban guerrilla warfare has had successes but only after years of conflict.4
The strategic context for Hamas on 7th October defies logic: an audacious attack leading to a known crushing military response from Israel.
Israel: the strategic context
Israel built a $6bn defensive wall to prevent a Hamas attack. The 2014 war revealed the wall was ineffective. Hamas simply dug tunnels beneath it.
Israeli generals have ‘perfect’ knowledge of Hamas’s capabilities and the geography of Gaza. The terrain is mapped as are most of the web of tunnels. Israel need to degrade the capabilities of Hamas on the ground to avoid unacceptable losses.
The Israeli’s strategy is using their command of the air space to systematically bomb tunnel routes. This involves mass destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure. The 2023 strategy is massive bombing raids to win the ground war from the air.5
Nonetheless Israel can’t avoid an invasion as their war aim is the annihilation of Hamas.
Hamas and Israel: Strategic Known-Unknowns
What Known-Unknowns (see addendum) might Hamas have calculated?
Israel has multiple enemies and Hamas might have hoped that they’d enter the war once it began. Their spectacular initial attack could encourage Hezbollah6 north of Israel to open a second front. Meanwhile the occupied West Bank – the other half of Palestine – is in state of permanent unrest. Hamas could realistically hope they’d take the opportunity to attack whilst Israel was occupied in Gaza.
For Hamas a positive Known-Unknown is a war on three fronts dividing Israeli military attention.
What Known-Unknowns might come into the calculations of Israel?
After 2014, Israeli war aims changed to the annihilation of Hamas. Crushing air raids are intended to create an atmosphere for regime change from within. Air raids plus systematic reduction in the quality of life was meant to be decisive. Once Hamas lost popular support, their principal headquarters would be identified by collaborators and Israel could mop them up.
For Israel a positive Known-Unknown would be general revulsion of Hamas leading to their loss of political, military and moral authority in Gaza.
Hamas and Israel: Unknown-Unknowns
This formulation is a penetrating insight into the ‘Fog of War’. Therefore, anything suggested is speculation.
Hamas might hope Donald Trump wins the USA election and implements a policy of opposition to ‘forever wars’.7
Israel might hope Hezbollah, in Lebanon, and Fatah, in the West Bank, publicly oppose Hamas and demand surrender.
Other unknown-unknowns are grim.
Addendum: Donald Rumsfeld’s thoughts on war
“Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tends to be the difficult ones.”
Notes
1 2014 Gaza War – Wikipedia
2 Củ Chi tunnels – Wikipedia
3 Warsaw Uprising – Wikipedia
4 The British civil war 1968-98 is a good example. Strictly speaking that ended in a ‘draw’.
5 Bombing has never crushed a civilian population regardless of how fierce. Hamburg 1943 and Tokyo 1945 are classic examples. See Bombing Civilians Doesn’t Win Wars | Odeboyz’s Blog (oedeboyz.com)
6 Hezbollah – Wikipedia
7 Trump Said He’d End ‘Forever Wars,’ But Leaves Troops Behind | TIME
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