Nazi Germany’s pre-1941 successes were unprecedented. They are epitomised by the 1939 diplomatic coup, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty. The partition of Poland followed immediately. 1940 saw crushing victories in western Europe. Germany’s triumphs weren’t critically analysed by either the political or military leadership. This led to the delusional belief that invading the Soviet Union would be straight-forward.
The campaigns of 1939 and 1940 induced hubris and were the road to disaster.
The Polish Campaign, 1939
The Polish campaign was interpreted as a German victory. In reality, it was a partition of a weak country, by two overwhelmingly strong armies. Poland was forced to fight against Germany from the west and the USSR from the east. There were no military lessons to be learned from this campaign beyond the obvious one that politics is very important in warfare.
The Military Victory, 1940
Germany conquered western Europe in the spring and early summer of 1940. The Wehrmacht didn’t appreciate the uniqueness of the campaign. Their High Command knew the quality of western European armies. Western Europe’s terrain, weather, road and rail networks and urban environment had been studied for years. The audacious attack through the Ardennes was only possible because there were no logistical surprises.
Importantly the entire German army of 3.5 million men was employed. Additionally, the campaign was a modification of ‘traditional’ invasion plans used in 1870 and 1914. The 1940 plan avoided trench warfare, which had wrecked the 1914 campaign.
The Political Victory, 1940
Germany’s political conquest was crucial because the conquered countries made the invasion less problematic. This is illustrated by the lack of destruction in France, making it almost an agreed invasion. The French collaborationist government of Marshal Petain took office immediately.2 Norway’s prime minister, Quisling, followed suit3 whilst others accepted conquest.
Marshal Petain’s government sub-divided France with Hitler. His government conceded the north and west to Germany. Norway collaborated and was occupied with a garrison of 100,000+ troops but there was little guerrilla action.3,6 King Leopold, of Belgium, stayed in Brussels accepting German military administration.4 Denmark took a pragmatic attitude and cooperated.
“Contrary to the situation in other countries under German occupation, most Danish institutions continued to function relatively normally until 1945.”5 (my emphasis)
Finland and Italy were allies of Germany.7,8 Curiously the Dutch were regarded as Herrenvolk9 – Master Race – and were treated accordingly.
The German High Command didn’t understand the pivotal nature of the political victory in the west before launching Operation Barbarossa. The Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS and horror-show death squads destroyed any possibility of collaboration in the Soviet Union. The Ukraine, which had been savaged in the 1930s by Stalin, should have been cultivated.10 They greeted the Germans as liberators and wanted to collaborate but were rejected.
Military Collaboration
Conquered countries provided volunteers for the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS.11 These amounted to about half a million men. This figure matched the German soldiers who were garrisoning their countries. France had a garrison of about 300,000 Germans after 1940 and Norway about 150,000. Significant military support came from Germany’s allies. (see Addendum)
Conclusion
The exhilarating triumphs of 1939 and 1940 fatally distorted the Nazi leadership’s mindset. They believed they were invincible. Western Europe was analysed in terms of German strength and not as European political and military weakness. An important feature of the western European victory was the fact the German High Command knew the region intimately. An undefeated Britain was seen as a trivial detail which would be resolved later.
Hubris destroyed critical thinking. The idea that 1939 and 1940 could be replicated in an invasion of a continental sized country was nonsense. France, for example, covers 643,000 km2 whereas the Soviet Union dwarfs it with 22.4m kms.2 Thirty-five times larger. France was a collaborationist country garrisoned with 300,000 troops in 1941. Assuming total victory, over the Soviet Union and taking France as the benchmark, the Germans would have needed a garrison of 10,500,000 soldiers, three times the size of the entire Wehrmacht.
The road to disaster was pathed with stupendous military and political successes. This blinded principal decision-makers to the actualité. None of the challenges the Wehrmacht faced in the Soviet Union were unknown. They were all lethal. The greatest surprise was how long the defeat took.
Addendum: Germany’s Allies
Germany’s allies provided many troops. Finland provided 500,000 to 750,000 troops for the Baltic region war. They saw Operation Barbarossa as a continuation of the Winter War, 1939-40 when they’d fought the Soviet Union to a standstill.12 Italy’s contingent was 300,000 troops.13 Romania was the other major contributor with 330,000 well equipped men.14 This meant that about a third of Germany’s armies were formed from a coalition of allies.
Notes
1 Time Zones in Russia (timeanddate.com)
4 German occupation of Belgium during World War II – Wikipedia
5 Denmark in World War II – Wikipedia
6 German occupation of Norway – Wikipedia
9 Reichskommissariat Niederlande – Wikipedia
10 Ukrainian national government (1941) – Wikipedia The Ukrainians use the word Holodomor to express the horror of the repression they suffered at Stalin’s hands, which is conceptually connected to the Holocaust Holodomor – Wikipedia
11 Waffen-SS foreign volunteers and conscripts – Wikipedia
12 Continuation War – Wikipedia
13 Italian participation on the Eastern Front – Wikipedia
14 Rumanian Forces: Operation Barbarossa, June-July 1941 | Operation Barbarrosa
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